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Abstract 
Research suggests that a country does not need inequity to have high performance. However, 
such research has potentially suffered from confounders present in between-country 
comparative research (e.g., latent cultural differences). Likewise, relatively little 
consideration has been given to whether the situation may be different for high- or low-
performing students. Using five cycles of the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) database, the current research explores within-country trajectories in 
achievement and inequality measures to test the hypothesis of an excellence/equity tradeoff in 
academic performance. We found negative relations between performance and inequality that 
are robust and of statistical and practical significance. Follow-up analysis suggests a focus on 
low and average performers may be critical to successful policy interventions. 
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Inequity and Excellence in Academic Performance: Evidence From 27 Countries 
Educational policy aims to maximize educational excellence and reduce inequity. The 
need to balance these demands is an ongoing concern in social mobility (Burger, 2016), 
educational attainment (Goldthorpe, 2007), and to a lesser degree, concerns about 
performance in standardized tests (Checchi, 2006). Our paper is primarily concerned with 
issues relating to the association between national performance in standardized tests 
(educational excellence) and the degree of variation in performance within a nation (our 
measure of educational inequity). It is our hypothesis that greater variance in test scores—
greater inequality—will be negatively associated with higher average educational 
achievement—or higher excellence. We seek to directly challenge views that a country’s 
educational policies must incorporate some inequality to produce higher average test scores. 
To test this hypothesis, we consider a range of inequality measures. Unlike previous research, 
we focus on (a) changes that occur within countries over time and (b) where in the academic 
achievement distribution the changes occur. In the following sections, we first position our 
research within the broader domain of educational inequity before outlining competing 
positions on the excellent/equity tradeoff in educational ability. Finally, we consider what 
empirical research currently suggests about this debate and the limitations with the existing 
evidence base that we seek to overcome. 
Excellence Versus Equality 
Debates over excellence in education often suggest that educational systems produce 
the highest average performance if schools can tailor offerings to children of different 
academic ability (for a review, see Hoxby, 2003; Van de Werfhorst & Mijs, 2010; for an 
applied introduction, see Walberg, 2000). Checchi (2006; see also Hoxby, 2003) provides a 
detailed treatment of this line of reasoning, but the argument states that in the absence of 
government Parker et al. 2 interference, families will choose a level and type of education for 
their children that will maximize the child’s achievement and should this occur for most 
children, maximize the achievement of the nation as a whole (Friedman, 2002; Hoxby, 2003). 
At the core of this idea is that differentiated, stratified, decentralized, and/or private or 
privatized education (for a review, see Bol & Van de Werfhorst, 2013; Kerckhoff, 1995; 
Parker, Jerrim, Schoon, & Marsh, 2016) provides a context that prepares children with 
different ability with appropriate skills. This may mean less talented children are provided 
with educational content specifically focused on vocational skills (for an overview, see 
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Brunello & Checchi, 2007). For talented children no longer hampered by the need for 
teachers to limit the scope and speed of content for the benefit of less talented children, 
increased education system variance will maximize their learning gains (see Van de 
Werfhorst & Mijs, 2010). Under this model, increased academic excellence for a country will 
tend to be associated with greater variance in achievement due to selection effects, signaling, 
and different educational content (Jakubowski, Patrinos, Porta, & Wisniewski, 2010; Parker 
et al., 2016; Pfeffer, 2015). Thus, inequality is a necessary condition for excellence. Because 
of this, there is a potential conflict in policy between maximizing excellence (i.e., 
maximizing average levels of achievement by allowing children to match their education to 
their potential) and limiting inequity (i.e., minimizing the variability in outcomes between 
children; Gans & King, 2014). According to the tradeoff position, excellence (i.e., high 
performance) comes with the cost of inequality. But does the empirical evidence support this? 
Excellence/Equality Tradeoff 
Underlying the excellence/equity tradeoff position is the belief that policymakers need 
to balance the competing demands of promoting excellence and reducing inequality. 
Inequality may come about via several mechanisms. First, educational differentiation or 
school choice means that different children receive different levels or types of education. 
Second, it may be that excessive variance in academic achievement occurs due to 
mechanisms unrelated to government policy or at least unrelated to government education 
policy. For example, increased variance may come about due to wider social stratification by 
race, ethnicity, or social class (e.g., Rowe & Lubienski, 2017). Third, there may be barriers 
that prevent children from disadvantaged backgrounds from gaining access to the type of 
education best suited to their underlying talent. Indeed, due to limited access to economic or 
other resources, risk adversity, or poor decision making, parents might choose a type of 
education that is inappropriate for the child and policies are required that provide such 
children with educational chances more in keeping with their ability (Friedman, 2002; Gans 
& King, 2014). Excellence Does Not Require Inequality 3 Suggestions for policy 
interventions that emerge from the tradeoff position often indicate that apart from ensuring 
that talented children are not misplaced, policy should not try to minimize variance in 
academic ability within a country (Walberg, 2000). Under this belief, achievement 
differentiation, decentralization, privatization, and stratification should be encouraged as they 
increase the options available to parents and improve overall performance. Yet government 
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intervention should still focus on reducing the risks of student misplacement within this 
system (Friedman & Friedman, 1980). 
Empirical Evidence 
The underlying theory of the excellence/equity tradeoff is elegant. Yet, it has been 
increasingly disputed by empirical evidence derived mainly from studies using large-scale 
international student assessments (for a review, see Van de Werfhorst & Mijs, 2010). 
Anecdotally, criticism of the excellence/equity tradeoff comes from the observation that high-
performing countries like Finland appear to combine low levels of inequality (including both 
low barriers to entry and relatively undifferentiated education) with high levels of 
performance in international tests (Simola, 2005). Empirically, evidence questioning the 
benefits of inequality comes from two strands of evidence: (a) empirical results that show that 
high variance leads to considerable inequality in educational outcomes and (b) empirical 
research that shows that educational systems with high academic ability variance may have 
poorer average performance. In relation to the former, Brunello and Checchi (2007) found 
that tracking is related to disadvantages for poorer children in both educational attainment 
and labor market outcomes and that these effects are larger the earlier the tracking. Jerrim, 
Chmielewski, and Parker (2015) found that private schooling in Australia, the UK, and the 
United States was associated with advantages in both education and labor market outcomes. 
Finally, Parker et al. (2016) found that ability stratification was associated with lower 
expectations of university attainment for poorer children controlling for academic 
achievement. In relation to the second stream of evidence, Hanushek and Wo¨ßmann (2005) 
found that early tracking increased educational inequality and that it was associated with 
lower mean performance. Micklewright and Schnepf (2007) showed that the distance 
between the 95th and 5th percentiles in achievement and the median performance within a 
country was negatively correlated. Likewise, Checchi, van de Werfhorst, Braga, and Meschi 
(2014) found no or negative relationships between various forms of variance and 
stratification and average achievement. In addition to data on educational performance is 
research on educational attainment. Thomas, Wang, and Fan (2001) found a negative 
relationship between a Gini index (a relative measure of inequality) of years of education and 
the average years of education within a country for countries within the developed world. 
Pfeffer Parker et al. 4 (2015) found that there was no relationship between performance in 
international adult skills assessment and inequity of opportunities. Overall, this suggests that 
there is little evidence that inequality is needed for excellence in academic performance, at 
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least within rich countries. Significantly, almost all of the research to date has focused on 
between- (cross-sectional) rather than within-country (multicohort) relationships. It is also 
important to note that changes in stratification may or may not occur evenly across the 
achievement distribution, with changes in variance at the top or bottom half potentially being 
of most importance. Where changes in variance occur could potentially have different 
implications. For example, Micklewright and Schnepf (2007) suggest that inequality tends to 
be largest in the bottom half of the achievement distribution. Thus, increases in polarity 
(movement from the median of the distribution to the tails) at the bottom end of the 
distribution may be most important. Indeed, Poland has had particular success at improving 
performance by introducing policy targeting such students (Breakspear, 2012). Alternatively, 
Ryan (2013), focusing only on Australia, suggests that declines in the top half of the 
distribution account for that country’s decline in math performance. This indicates that 
reduction in polarity at the top end of the distribution (i.e., the highest performers becoming 
more similar to the median performer) is of most concern. 
Current Research 
The current research makes use of over a decade of the Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) data to explore the association between changes in country 
inequality and changes in country average achievement. As such, we advance the following 
hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Trends in inequality from 2000 to 2012 will be zero or negatively 
related to trends in performance over the same period.  
Hypothesis 2: Changes in inequality from one PISA round to the next will be zero or 
negatively related to changes in performance for the same rounds. Both Hypotheses 1 and 2 
are founded on the hypothesis that inequality is not a necessary requirement for academic 
excellence.  
Hypothesis 3: When large changes in inequality occur, changes at the top or bottom of 
the achievement distribution will be differentially associated with changes of average 
achievement. We use the term trend when considering movements in inequality or average 
achievement as a linear line through all the PISA cycles under consideration. The term 
change is reserved for when we are averaging the changes from one PISA cycle to the next. 
We do not consider the effect of a previous wave in inequality on changes in achievement (or 
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vice versa). Rather, in all models, we are focused on simultaneous change in achievement and 
inequality. 
Measures of Inequality 
We note that a number of different measures of inequality have been used in the 
literature. These include measures focused on how children of different levels of ability are 
sorted into schools such as the between-school achievement variance or intraclass correlation 
coefficient (ICC) (Marks, 2006; Parker et al., 2016; Salchegger, 2016). These measures 
provide an index of the degree to which a country’s education system segregates children of 
different levels of academic ability into different schools. This measure incorporates both 
formal (e.g., tracking) and informal (e.g., social segregation) differentiation (see Parker et al., 
2016). Other measures focus on the degree of variance in academic performance between 
children within the same country. These include absolute or relative (i.e., scale invariant) 
measures (for a review, see Handcock & Morris, 1999). We use a selection of all of these 
indexes, including (a) ICC as a measure of the amount of betweenschool ability stratification, 
(b) the distance between the 95th and 5th percentiles in achievement as a measure of absolute 
variance in achievement (see Micklewright & Schnepf, 2007), (c) a constructed Gini index of 
achievement, and (d) where possible, relative polarity as relative indexes of variance 
(Handcock & Morris, 1999). There are few criteria for what indicates large or small variation 
in these measures, and this is particularly the case in the context in which we use them, where 
we rely on trends or change over time. In the absence of criteria then, we undertake extensive 
sensitivity analyses using multiple measures across multiple academic domains with multiple 
statistical methods. Thus, our focus is on results that show consistency across these 
approaches. 
Method 
Participants 
All analyses were done at the country level using participant-level indicators of math, 
science, and reading achievement from all five PISA rounds. PISA provides data on a 
representative sample of 15-year-olds. We focused on OECD countries (based on 
membership as of 2000) with the exception of Mexico and Turkey.1 The data are collected in 
a two-stage procedure with schools selected proportional to size and a random sample of 15-
year-olds selected from within each school (OECD, 2004). A set of weights is provided so 
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that the sample is representative of the target population. In total, participants came from 27 
countries for a total sample size of 1,026,173 for analysis related to reading achievement and 
957,735 for analysis related to math and science achievement. The reason for the difference 
in participant numbers is that all participants received reading scores in PISA 2000 but only a 
subsample received either math or the science scores. In all other PISA rounds, participants 
received estimated performance scores for all domains. 
Measures 
Academic Performance 
Children’s academic achievement was measured via performance on a standardized 
test in math, reading, and science. The achievement tests used in PISA are designed 
specifically to enable cross-national comparisons in academic achievement. PISA differs 
from other international measures of academic performance as it focuses on functional ability 
rather than knowledge or mastery of a curriculum. Answers from the achievement tests were 
summarized by the survey organizers into a single score for each of the three domains using 
an item-response model, the intention being that true skill in each subject is unobserved and 
must be estimated from the answers to the test (for further details, see OECD, 2004). Five 
plausible values were generated for each pupil, estimating their true proficiency in each 
subject. These scores were scaled by the survey organizers to have a mean of 500 points and 
standard deviation of 100 points across OECD countries in the first PISA round. Country 
average performance, Gini, and ICC were all estimated with the five plausible values 
separately and then averaged to provide country-specific point estimates. 
Gini Index  
The Gini index was calculated separately for each academic domain, country, and 
PISA round. As with all measures used in the present research, the Gini was calculated using 
the population weight via the reldist package in R (Handcock & Aldrich, 2002). This index 
varies between 0 (indicating a uniform distribution of achievement) and 1 (indicating that 
only a single individual had a non-zero achievement score). We multiplied the Gini index by 
100.  
Intraclass Correlation  
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ICCs estimate the degree to which students within a school resemble each other and 
differ on average from those in other schools in terms of academic achievement. Thus, higher 
estimates of ICCs reflect the degree to which schools were homogenous in academic 
achievement. ICCs were estimated after applying population weights. We also multiplied 
these by 100 so that they varied from 0 to 100 (see Marks, 2006).  
95th Percentile – 5th Percentile  
The distance between the 95th percentile (P95) and 5th percentile (P5) of achievement 
was likewise calculated after applying the population weight. There was evidence of change 
in achievement and all inequality indexes across the PISA cycles; however, this differed in 
size by country (see supplementary material in the online version of the journal). 
Statistical Analysis  
Modeling Approach  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 relied on exploring the relationship between estimates derived for 
each country. We focus here on estimates derived using a series of multilevel models with 
PISA cycle estimates nested within country. As such, all analyses were done at the country 
level, and no individual-level data were modeled in the analysis reported in the results. There 
are debates about how appropriate the use of multilevel models is in the context of country 
comparisons. In particular, there are concerns that random effects models remain common 
despite the fact that (a) countries are rarely sampled randomly from a population (or in our 
case include all or almost all countries in a relevant population; i.e., the OECD) and (b) 
country-specific estimates can be biased (due to shrinkage) when there are few countries 
(e.g., Byran & Jenkins, 2015). As such, we also tested the robustness of the results using 
country fixed effects models. Detailed consideration of model development is provided in the 
supplementary material in the online version of the journal. For trends, multilevel growth 
curve models were estimated (Hypothesis 1). In each case, both the intercept (i.e., initial level 
at year 2000) and slope (i.e., slope of the linear interpolated trajectories from 2000 to 2012) 
were estimated as country random effects. Such models were run separately for academic 
achievement and inequality measures. Country-specific slope estimates were drawn from the 
resulting parameter estimates. We also calculated the simple difference between PISA 2000 
and 2012 achievement and inequality measures and looked at the relationship between these. 
Growth curve models treat PISA cycles as an ordinal variable and thus summarize the change 
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across PISA cycles in relation to, for example, achievement as a linear trend. The benefit of 
this is that it provides a simple summary measure that reduces the influence of noise around 
this trajectory, thus reducing the impact of outlier cycles (e.g., where a country experiences a 
notable increase in only one PISA cycle before returning to baseline levels). However, it is 
possible that these results may be biased as they impose a linear trajectory from PISA 2000 to 
PISA 2012. We aimed to account for this by using change score models (Hypothesis 2). In 
this case, achievement at round k + 1 was regressed on achievement at round k with the 
regression estimate fixed to 1 (i.e., a simple difference score) and the change score of 
inequality from round k to k + 1. The result of this specification was that change in 
achievement was predicted by change in inequality over the same lag. Random effects for 
country were included. 
Variance Location  
Hypothesis 3 focused on where changes in inequality occurred in the achievement 
distribution. Using the reldist package in R (Handcock & Parker et al. 8 Morris, 1999), we 
isolated changes in the achievement distribution from 2000 to 2012 in relation to shape (e.g., 
changes in skewness) and location (e.g., movement of the population as a whole up or down 
the achievement distribution). We took two approaches to this. First, we explored the 
relationship between relative polarity (RP; i.e., degree of movement from the median to the 
tails of the distribution from one PISA cycle to the next) and changes in achievement for all 
countries. Second, we selected several countries that displayed considerable change in 
achievement from 2000 to 2012 for a more detailed analysis. We use both RP measures as 
well as plots of changes in the achievement distribution, decomposed into location and shape 
changes. All RP indexes vary from 21 to 1, with negative values indicating decreased polarity 
or a movement of values toward the median. The median relative polarity (RPM) index 
provides an overall estimate. This can be decomposed to explore the upper (RPU) and lower 
(RPL) portions of the distribution. 
Results 
Hypothesis 1: Associations in Trends  
We first looked at whether linear trends in achievement from 2000 to 2012 were 
related to linear trends in inequality. For this, we extracted country-level trends from (a) a 
series of random intercepts and slopes models, (b) a series of country fixed effect models, and 
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(c) the simple difference between achievement and inequality measures from PISA 2000 to 
PISA 2012 (hereafter simple). As shown in Table 1, the relationship between the trend in 
achievement and the trend in inequality was negative in all cases. In support of Hypothesis 1, 
countries that increased in achievement from 2000 to 2012 tended to also decline in 
inequality measures. Relationships were strongest for Gini and ICC indexes (Gini: mean r = –
.658; ICC: mean r = –.524), with correlations routinely around –.50 and frequently above –
.70. The relationships were more moderate for P95 – P5 (mean r = –.313) and typically only 
significant for science (note that average correlations are Pearson correlations). The 
correlations were similar for all achievement domains, with Figure 1, derived from the 
multilevel models, showing the relationship between the linear trajectory of math 
achievement and inequality. The supplementary material in the online version of the journal 
provides figures for reading and science. Hypothesis 2: Association in Change Scores The 
analysis presented previously focused on linear trends in achievement and inequality from 
2000 to 2012. However, it is possible that these results do not give an accurate reflection of 
the relationship between associations in simultaneous changes in achievement and inequality 
(see methodology for a discussion). To account for this, we looked at the relationship 
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between changes in achievement and changes in inequality from one PISA wave to the next 
(Table 2). For all academic domains, a change in the Gini index from one PISA round to the 
next was associated with a significant counteracting change across the same cycles in average 
achievement (β range = –.369 to –.413). On their original metrics, a 1-point increase in Gini 
(inequality) was associated with a 6-point (for science) to 10-point (for math) decline in 
achievement for changes across the same PISA cycles. Significant associations were likewise 
found for reading and science for ICCs and for reading for P95 – P5. Effect sizes were 
moderate for the Gini index (mean β = –.387) and ICCs (mean β = –.361) and small for P95 – 
P5 (mean β = –.132). Hypothesis 3: Where Does Inequality Change? A focus on change 
scores also allowed us to consider changes in relative polarity from one PISA wave to the 
next. In all cases, the estimates were negative, suggesting that inequality is not a requirement 
for excellence (see Table 2). Supporting Hypothesis 3, the effects for RPM and RPL were 
only significant in one case. Overall, the relationships were strongest for the upper half of the 
achievement distribution and significant or marginally significant for all domains (mean β = –
.264). This indicates that declines in achievement may be more strongly weighted toward  
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increases in inequality in the upper portion of the achievement distribution. Put simply, 
declining PISA scores tended to be associated with average-performing students falling 
further behind the highest performing students such that the right tail of the distribution 
became increasingly elongated (i.e., the highest performing students tend to be protected 
against declines in achievement). However, the difference between RPL and RPU were 
relatively small though nevertheless sufficient enough to suggest a more in-depth 
consideration would be beneficial. We finally considered where in the achievement 
distribution changes in inequality tended to occur for countries that experienced notable 
changes. Given space constraints, we focused on Germany, Poland, Sweden, and Iceland as 
these were the countries in which the largest changes in achievement and inequality occurred. 
Germany and Poland were the only two countries to improve by over 20 achievement points 
and decreased in Gini by over 1 point for each domain between 2000 and 2012. Sweden 
declined by almost 30 points in each domain and increased in Gini by over 1 point in both 
reading and science (and over half a point in math). Likewise, Iceland increased in Gini by 
over 1 point in each domain and declined in achievement by over 20 points in math and 
reading (and over 17 points in science). 
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The results indicated significant changes in polarity for each country in at least two of 
the three achievement domains (see Table 3). Germany and Poland declined in polarity (see 
plots in supplementary material in the online version of the journal). Germany predominantly 
declined in the upper portion of the distribution, with Poland displaying most change in the 
lower portion. However, for reading in Germany and reading and science in Poland, 
significant declines in polarity occurred in both RPL and RPU. This shape change resulted in 
fewer individuals in the lower and upper deciles than would have been the case if changes in 
achievement from 2000 to 2012 were due to location changes alone (i.e., mean rather than 
distribution shape). Sweden and Iceland both significantly increased in relative polarity. In 
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both cases, changes were predominantly located in the upper portion of the distribution. What 
this means is that as Sweden and Iceland declined in average achievement, the most talented 
students were partially protected. Thus, there were frequently 20% to 30% more students in 
the top decile than would be expected if achievement declines were consistent across the 
whole distribution. Indeed, for science achievement in Iceland, there were approximately 
equal numbers of students in the top decile of the reference distribution at both PISA 2000 
and 2012 when there should have been only 60% as many individuals in 2012 if there was no 
change in relative polarity (see Figure 2). 
Discussion 
Consistent with growing evidence (e.g., Checchi et al., 2014; Micklewright & 
Schnepf, 2007), our results suggest that inequality, indexed by stratification or variance in 
achievement, is negatively associated with average achievement at the country level. 
Importantly, effect sizes were routinely of a similar size for both relative Gini (variance) and 
ICC (stratification) indexes of inequality. Relationships were smaller but still negative and 
often significant for absolute measures of variance (see the following). We extended previous 
research by focusing on within-country changes in inequality and its association with within-
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country changes in average achievement. Not only were results consistent with previous 
research in showing that inequality is not necessary to produce excellence, they also 
suggested that increases in inequality within a country may be associated with declines in 
performance. When considered from a within-country perspective, traditional dividing lines 
between educational systems evaporated. Nordic countries have often been shown to be 
among the most equal in between-country studies (e.g., Parker et al., 2016, 2017). When 
considering within-country estimates however, Iceland and Sweden had some of the most 
evident declines in achievement and increases in inequality of all countries considered.  
Alternatively while Germanic countries have been shown to be some of the most 
unequal due to early and extensive tracking, Germany has shown considerable improvement 
in academic achievement, which has been associated with notable decreases in inequality. 
Taken together, while between-country differences continue to follow traditional 
demarcations in inequality—Nordic\ Anglophone \ Germanic—(see Dupriez & Dumay, 
2006), within-country analysis shows a shifting landscape where these monikers hold less 
relevance. This could be taken to suggest that overall, the inter-country landscape is 
becoming more equal. However, there were notable increases in intraclass correlations PISA 
2000 to 2012 (see supplementary material in the online version of the journal). Thus, the 
trend for OECD countries is actually toward greater inequality. It may be that changes 
unrelated to direct educational policy are driving these results. As such, we ran further 
sensitivity analysis on the country fixed effects presented in Table 1. In this case, we 
calculated the partial correlation coefficients between academic excellence and our inequity 
measures controlling for trajectories across the same period (2000–2012) in Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP, in US dollars), average disposable income, and the percentage of GDP spent 
on social welfare. As Table 4 shows, the results were similar to those reported in Table 1. 
Why Is Excellence Not Positively Related to Higher Variance? A major question that 
emerges from the current research is why there is so  
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little evidence that inequity is a requirement for excellence. To some degree, this is answered 
by proponents of the tradeoff argument themselves, namely, that decisions relating to the 
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amount and type of education that a child should invest in is a decision 
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not made by the child themselves but rather by parents or guardians. Such parents may not 
make decisions that lead to the best possible school placement (Friedman, 2002). Widespread 
and systematic inefficiencies in child assignment could account for the results noted here (see 
Pfeffer, 2015). Indeed, PISA data suggest that misplacement occurs across the socioeconomic 
ladder (Parker et al., 2017). For example, Maaz, Trautwein, Lu¨dtke, and Baumert (2008) 
note that in the Germanic system, parents from well-off families often ensure that their 
children are located in university track systems even when teacher recommendations are for 
lower track placements. Further, Parker et al. (2017) show that children of richer parents pay 
for poor placement with decreased academic self-concept. Conversely, children of poorer 
parents would likely gain in self-concept by inaccurate school placement but pay in terms of 
more difficult pathways to university. This would suggest that the problem is not with the 
idea that a school system should tailor offerings to different levels of the achievement 
distribution but rather with its application in context. However, inherent problems with 
school inequality suggest issues may continue to occur even with perfect placement. 
Evidence from educational psychology points to a natural bias in the way young people form 
expectations. Dicke et al. (in press) argue that children in more selective schools have lower 
academic self-concepts than they would have had they gone to more comprehensive 
schools—a so-called big-fish-little-pond effect. An important extension of this is that lower 
self-concept leads to lower performance in a reciprocal spiral (a reciprocal effects model 
[REM]; Dicke et al., in press). PISA data show that this effect is larger in countries with more 
tracking or higher ICCs (Salchegger, 2016). It is possible that this bias in self-perceptions 
may account for some of the reason why more stratified systems do worse than expected if 
inequality led to more efficient teaching and thus great academic excellence. Alternatively, 
nonlinear peer effects in learning quality likely provide equally compelling explanation of 
these results for the low end of the achievement distribution. Nonlinear effects suggest that 
high-performing students tend to lose very little from association with poorer performing 
students but poorer performing students gain considerable benefits in terms of motivation and 
quality of peer interaction (Checchi, 2006; Hanushek, Kain, Markman, & Rivkin, 2003; 
Hanushek & Wo¨ßmann, 2005). Countries should consider the findings here and determine 
whether students across the achievement distribution may actually benefit from more 
integrated classrooms—though always with an eye to the local policy context. 
Changes in Inequality 
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The current research suggested that increases in stratification measures of inequality 
are associated with decreases in average achievement. We considered average change in 
variance for all countries but also the form of this change. Declines in achievement were 
mostly associated with protection of high-performing students and fall in average- and low-
performing students. Taken as a whole, there was evidence of an effective hollowing out of 
the middle of the achievement distribution where there was increasing polarization between 
the most talented students and the rest. In-depth analysis of countries that changed 
considerably from PISA 2000 to PISA 2012 (i.e., 20 PISA points and 1 Gini point) provided 
a more nuanced perspective on this issue. Ringarp and Rothland (2010) note that Sweden has 
moved from one of the most to one of the least centralized educational systems, with 
increased school choice and privatization in the past few decades. Iceland has long had a 
decentralized school system with considerable school choice. However, decentralization was 
strengthened by policy in 2008, and the implication of this policy likely increased after the 
global financial crisis, where local communities responded to a reduction in educational 
funding in a diverse number of ways (Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, 2014). 
Importantly, this led to considerable regional differences in declines in PISA performance. In 
contrast, the ‘‘PISA shock’’ of 2000 in Germany led to a national conversation on education, 
an increase in centralization, and a focus on lower performers and immigrants (Breakspear, 
2012). In Poland, there was a strong focus on the poorest performing students in response to 
PISA results (Breakspear, 2012). Our findings suggest that for Germany, increases in 
performance mostly centered on the middle of achievement distribution. For Poland, our 
results show the success of their focus on the bottom of the achievement distribution. Taking 
all the results together, a hypothesis emerges that a country’s educational policy that mainly 
serves talented students will be associated with lower average performance. Alternatively, a 
focus on the lower and middle portions of the achievement distribution will be associated 
with higher average ability. Overall, there is a need for future research that focuses not just on 
changes in inequality overall but on where changes occur and what implications this has for 
how a given country should determine its educational policies when its own unique context is 
considered. 
Measures of Inequality  
There were modest differences in the results depending on the measure of inequality 
used. However, before discussing these differences, we want to emphasize the broad 
consistencies. First, the direction of the relationship between inequality and performance was 
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always negative regardless of the measure used or the model used to test the relationship. 
Second, each measure of inequality was significantly negative for at least one achievement 
domain in each model. Nevertheless, we did observe modest differences. Primary among 
them was that the relative measures of variance (Gini) and stratification (ICC) were similar in 
size and routinely larger than the absolute measure (95th – 5th percentile). This may be due 
to the relative measures having proportional scale invariance while the absolute measures do 
not (Handcock & Morris, 1999). Given this property, it may be that the relative measures are 
more clearly comparable across time and context than the absolute measures.  
Education Policy Consideration and Limitations Given the Current Evidence  
Our research findings are consistent with a broader set of research (e.g., Checchi et 
al., 2014; Hanushek & Wo¨ßmann, 2005; Micklewright & Schnepf, 2007; Van de Werfhorst 
& Mijs, 2010) that has questioned the value of educational policies, at both a state or nation 
level, that promote school differentiation, and thus there is a continued need to consider 
aspects of government policy related to decentralization, private or privatized schooling, and 
tracking. All these policies promote stratification by ability and as such do not appear to lead 
to higher average academic ability. As noted previously, countries such as Sweden and 
Iceland have increased decentralization and school choice and have seen notable declines in 
performance, while Germany has moved toward increased centralization and seen an increase 
in performance. However, readers should consider three caveats when interpreting what our 
results suggest for policy in a given country. First, average PISA achievement is only one 
measure of an education system’s performance, and the achievement tests on which our 
results are based are low stakes. Speaking against this concern is modeling that implies that 
improvements in PISA scores are linked with real-world outcomes such as economic growth 
(see Hanushek & Wo¨ßmann, 2010). Nevertheless, future researchers might want to consider 
a wider range of outcomes. For example, in Germany, though tracking is associated with 
poorer average achievement, retention through the full program of study is high (Checchi et 
al., 2014). Likewise, readers should consider if policies and social change at other levels of 
society may require an increase in decentralization and school choice or at least make such 
policies more appealing. As Friedman (2002) notes, school choice may be one of the only, or 
at least one of the most effective, means of reducing educational inequality in the face of 
increasing geographic segregation by income. School choice could do this by providing 
children in very poor regions’ access to high-quality schools in other districts. Indeed, 
countries like the United States have seen exceptional increase in geographic segregation in 
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recent years (Owens, Reardon, & Jencks, 2016), and thus, there is good opportunity to test 
Friedman’s hypothesis. However, readers should be aware that initial empirical evidence 
suggests that school choice in the context of residential segregation may actually exacerbate 
inequality for disadvantaged children (Saporito, 2003). While the multicohort evidence 
presented here is a step forward over previous cross-sectional evidence, the results should not 
be taken as indicative of causation. In particular, the causal direction is unclear because we 
concern ourselves only with associations between trends in achievement and inequality for 
the same cycles. Our results show that a country can combine both excellence and low 
inequality (see also Simola, 2005). However, it is not certain that inequality leads to poorer 
performance or whether poorer performance limits the scope for countries to focus more 
closely on issues of inequality. Likewise, the correlation between excellence and inequality 
may be a proxy for other factors. In particular, social structure, not school structure, could 
drive these results—although previous research suggests this is unlikely (Dupriez & Dumay, 
2006). More probable is that changes in funding between schools or between regions within 
countries could account for these results (Owens et al., 2016). Likewise, changes in school-
to-school or regional differences in school quality could account for our findings. Age of 
First Selection and Other Challenges to Our Conclusions  
A notable challenge to our interpretation of the results presented here is that they 
compare systems with different ages of first selection (Pfeffer, 2015), that is, the age at which 
students are streamed into different tracks. Thus, for example, PISA tests students at age 15, 
and yet a number of OECD countries begin tracking students at age 16 (Bol & Van de 
Werfhorst, 2013; Pfeffer, 2015). This has implications for our interpretation of the results for 
Poland that, as part of the reform of the education system, lifted the age of first selection from 
15 to 16 years of age (Jakubowski et al., 2010). Thus, a criticism of our work is that systems 
that do not track before age 15 are merely delaying the inevitable. Indeed, Jakubowski et al. 
(2010) showed that achievement differences between vocational and academic track Polish 
students increased at age 16, after the change in policy, in the same way they did before the 
policy change. There are several points to be made here. First, Pfeffer’s results are similar in 
conclusion to ours despite focusing on the adult population. Namely, there appears to be little 
evidence that inequality is a necessary condition for excellence (or quality in Pfeffer’s 
terminology; see literature review) when measured after schooling. Second, even if it is the 
case that inequality observed in differentiated systems eventually emerges in late tracking 
systems (Jakubowski et al., 2010), it is certainly not clear that the achievement advantage that 
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late tracking countries have over early tracking countries disappears when considering older 
samples. Again, the consistency between ours and Pfeffer’s results would seem to indicate 
that this fear is unfounded. 
Conclusion and Future Directions  
This paper, in combination with a growing amount of cross-sectional empirical 
research, provides compelling evidence that a negative relationship exists between average 
academic excellence and inequality. This is a problem for policies that promote 
decentralization, school choice, privatization, and segregation. However, future research and 
theory needs to explain why this negative relationship exists and under what social conditions 
it holds. Furthermore, there is clearly a need for research that further evaluates how changes 
in variance at different points in the achievement distribution affect average achievement. Put 
simply, research needs to determine whether and when policies directed toward those in the 
bottom half of the distribution are most effective. There is a need for researchers to consider 
what forces are behind changes in variance over relatively short periods of time in some 
countries (the current study covers only a single decade). In particular, further in-depth 
analysis of countries that have shown large change in achievement and inequality are needed 
to unpack the various structures and policies that lead to increases or decreases in inequality. 
Finally, there is a need for longitudinal versions of large-scale assessments such as PISA to 
determine long-term outcomes of inequity and excellence. As PIAAC (the adult skills 
assessment version of PISA) develops, linking PISA and PIAAC in a synthetic panel design 
may have advantages. 
Alternatively, assessments that incorporate a larger number of age groups and at 
different points in their schooling careers will be important to overcome difficulties 
associated with country differences in the age of first selection. In particular, as Pfeffer 
(2015) argues, large-scale assessment that includes the final year of compulsory schooling are 
needed. Nevertheless, utilizing multiple cycles of PISA, as we do here, provides a means of 
focusing attention on within-country changes (where policy contexts tend to be less variant). 
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